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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF U'TAH
GLEN A. HATCH and EDITH E. ,
HATCH,
Plaintiffs and Appella.nts)
-vs.-

Case No. 8215

W. S. HAT'CH COMPANY, a corporation and WILLARD S. HATCH,
DefendaJY~;ts arnd Respondewts.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, appellants
herein, to enjoin or abate a private nuisance in the use
by the defendants, respondents herein, of their lands
adjoining plaintiff's property on the north and east thereof, and for other relief. This action was brought under
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the authority of Section 78-38-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which is as follows:
"78-38-1. 'NUISANCE' DEFINED -RIGHT
OF' ACTION F'OR JUDG~fENT. - Anything
which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use
of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or pr'Operty, is a nuisance and
the subject of an action. Such action may be
brought by any p,erson whose property is injuriously affeeted, or whose personal enjoyment is
lessened by nuisanee; and by the judgment the
nuisance may be enjoined or[ahated], and darnages may also be recovered."
The cause ca1ne on for trial before the Honorable
Parley E. N orseth, Judge of the Second Judical Court,
sitting \vithout a jury, at Davis County, State of Utah.
The eourt entered findings of fact, conclusions of law
and decree in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs,
finding that no actionable nuisance existed, and dismissed p~laintiffs' eon1plaint with prejudice. This appeal
is taken fron1 said decree.
The facts show that the plain tiffs are o'vners of
certain residential and farm prop·erty located in Woods
Cross, Davis County, Utah, approxilnately 610 feet South
of the intersection of 5th South and 8th vVest Streets.
The W. S. Hatch Co. is a corporation of the State of
Utah, and W. S. Hatch is the president and manager
of the said corporation. The corporation owns or leases
land whieh adjoins the plaintiffs' property on the north
and east thereof. Up until about 1951, defendant~' only
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had land that adjoined plaintiffs' property on the north,
but at that time they leased the property which adjoins
plaintiffs' property ·on the east from Phillips PPtroleunl
Company, the owners thereof. Defendant~ conduct, both
upon the leased property and their ovvn property, a road
and fuel oil and acid tranportation and distribution business. Defendants run over 30 large units on this property
and use it f.or the maintenance, repairing, servic!ng·,
cleaning, starting and storing of the:<e large trucks, seutitrucks and trailers used for the transportation ·of oil and
acid.
The plaintiffs cornplained that defendants, in the
conduct of their business and in the maintenance, repairing, cleaning, starting and servicing of these trucks,
have caused and are causing, both day and night, loud
and unusual noises, to-wit: hanunering metal upon metal
parts of trucks, tires and other objects while n1aintaining
equipment and making repairs, changing tires and for
other purposes. It was also compla.jned that defendants,
in the cleaning and greasing of their equiprnent, cause
loud noises like hissing and squealing over a prolonged
period of time and that they cause loud noises in starting,
testing, and warrning up the engines of the various
trucks and tractors; and that they drive the said trucks
and tractors into and around the area without regard
to the noise rnade thereby and idle the engines of the
said trucks and tractors for prolongc·d periods of ti1ne
\Vith the throttle open so as to n1ake a large an1ount of
noise. Plaintiffs further co1nplainPd that the lights used
at night in the business are ·so located r.nd are of ~~ueh an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intensity that the light therefrom shines directly upon
and into the premises of the plaintiffs, especially into
the the bedroom of plaintiffs, resulting in loss of sleep
be~ause of the glare. It was further complained that
the defendant's. operation causes fumes of oil and exhaust
to enter plaintiffs' p·rop·erty creating an extremely unpleasant condition and tending to 1nake plaintiffs' hon1e
uninhabitable. Defendants were further complained of
for the reason that they put old tires, batteries, stoves,
metal and concrete refuse, etc., along the fence separa ting plainti'ffs' and defendants' property, thus constituting
an eyesore and fire hazard. Plaintiffs contended and do
contend that each and all of the above conditions constituted actionable nuisances under Section 78-38-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, and also under the recognized
law of nuisance as it exists in this. state.
The facts show that plaintiffs' home was orginally
constructed about 80 years ago and that plaintiff Glen
A. Hatch was born in the home and lived there until
five or six years of ·age "\Vhen he moved into the home
now ·occupied by his brother, Willard S. Hatch, and that
he lived in that ho1ne until he was 1narried in 1917 when
he moved hack into his present hon1e. The home \Va~
remodeled a tin1e or two and very extensively remodeled
in 1951. Plaintiffs' ho1ne and that home occupied by
defendant Willard S. Hatch, have al,vays been used
solely for residential purposes.
When the plaintiffs moved into their home after
their marri~age in 1917, the property in the en tire \~V oods
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Cross area 'vas used for residential and farming purposes with the exception of the railroad located in front
of their residence and one industry consisting of a corrugated pipe and headgate business located at the northeast corner of Fifth South and Eighth vVest Ntreet~
about an eighth of a mile from plaintiffs' home. (R-5,6)
There were also a small garage and t\YO stores in the
area. About 1925 the vVasatch Oil Conlpany, predece!SS'Or
in interest to the Phillips P·etroleum Cornpany, pur:chased
the Hardesty Manufacturing Con1pany building and
so1netirne thereafter started their refining operations
there. (R-7) Since that tiine other conunerc1a1 cons truction has corne into the area, consisting of the Phillips
loading doek, warehouse and storage building; a new
Phillips loading dock; the Mitchell (}ara.ge; the Drouba.y
G-arage; and the large e:xpansion of the Pl1il1ips plant
north of Fifth ·South Street. ( R-8, et seq)
At the present tirne the area 1nay he described
thusly:
Proceeding east from the intersection of Fifth South
and Eighth West Streets, on the north side of Fifth
South Street, there are located the railroad station,
the Hatch Brothers office building, forrnerly occupied as
a bank, and six or seven residence and farrns which are
west of the present Farrners' Hta.te Bank Building which
is just vvest of Highway 91. On the opposite side of
the street proceeding west fron1 Iiighvvay 91, there is
a service garage at the intersection of I-Iigh\vay 91 and
Fifth South, then nothing hut residences and farrus do\vn
to the Drouhay garage, west of \vhich are loeated a
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residence, a buil\ding, part of the Phillips operation, and
the Post ·Offic.e Building, respectively. Proceeding west'
from the intersection of F'ifth South and Eighth West on
the south side of the street there are no businesses and
·property i~s used entirely for residenti~al and farming purposes. This is true ·on both sides of Eighth West Street,
south of plaintiffs' residence, for a quarter of a mile.
At this point there is located a small display room for
showing boats. Further, the area to the east of the property leased from Phillips by the defendants is all used
for farming purposes, there being no business located
east thereof up· to the businesses located on Highway
91. The building north of the vVillard S. Hatch residence
occupied by W. S. Hatch Company and now used by S'aid
company as an office building \vas formerly a grocery
and general store building. To the north of Fifth South
Street on either side of Eighth West is the Phillips
Petroleum operation. (Defendants' Exhibits 1 and 6,
R-8, et seq)
The defendant Willard S. Hatch started his business
in about 1937 or 1938 with one small unit that he parked
in his barn or hay shed. He used this one unit a year
or two, and then he acquired another one and entered
into the business of transporting fuel oil. (R-179) At
the end of 1951 he had acquired 23 pieces of equipment.
In the year 1952 he acquired 13 additional units, and in
1953, 10 more, thereby doubling his equip1nent during
the year of 1952 and 1953; in addition he follovvs the
practice of leasing certain equip·ment. (R-138, 139) In
1952 and again in 1953, defendants substantially exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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panded their work shop, which expansions were rnade
after the acquisition by lease frorn the Phillips Petroluern
Con1pany of a large section of property behind the then
exisi ting operation. (R-190)
It was after this expansion cornn1enced, that is, after
1951, that the defendants expanded their business until
it became a 24 hour operation during the bu~y season,
(R-17) the busy season starting along in April and eontinning until November. (R-26) The increased ntunber
of trucks and equipment which frequented the defendants' premises and the increased \vork upon the equiprnent which resulted in a round-the-clock operation and
in a greatly increased use of lights, running of engines,
noise, etc., forced the plaintiffs to protest, first to the
defendants and finally in a court of law.
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STATEMENT OF POINT'S
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT IN THAT SAID FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS WERE NOT BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE AND
WERE CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO
NUISANCE EXISTS OR EXISTED, WHICH ERROR vV AS
BASED UPON A MISCONCEPTION OF THE LAW AND A
MISINTERPRETATION O·F THE FACTS AS BROUGHT OUT
BY THE EVIDENCE; AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL
COURT FURTHER ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
APPELLANTS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

POIN·T III
IF THIS CO·UR.T SHOULD FIND AN ACTIONABLE
NUISANCE DOES EXIS'T BUT FINDS FURTHER THAT
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE FO~RM OF AN INJUNCTIO·N, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN REJECTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES
AND THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
LOWER COURT TO PERMIT A FINDING AS TO THE,
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES TO WHICH APPELLANTS ARE
ENTITLED.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE
31 OF THE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED AN OBJECTION TO A QUESTION PUT BY APPELLANTS'
·COUNSEL TO APPELLANT GLEN A. HATCH,
WHICH QUESTION WAS DESIGNED TO ELICIT
TESTIMONY RELATIVE TO THE VALUE OF THE
APPELLANTS' PROPERTY.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE
70 OF THE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED A MOTION
TO STRIKE ALL OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE
APPELLANTS' EXPERT WITNESS LARSON.
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ARG1JMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN- MAKING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT IN THAT SAID FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS WERE NOT BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE AND
WERE CONTRARY. TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE"

It is the appellants' contention that the findings of
fact do not truly represent the situation as it exists· or
existed at the tin1e of the trial. It is con tended that s-aid
findings tend either to minimize absurdly or ignore totally certain facts which are, to say the least, pertinent
to any inquiry into the existence of a nuisance. Further,
there are other findings of fact couched in terrns "\Vhich
rnisrepresent or distort the true situation with respect
to facts which might otherwise inure to the benefit of
appellants. With the actual facts as they exist, \Ve find
no fault, hut we do feel that such a presentation as is
done in the final findings of fact included in the record
on appeal is erroneously prejudicial to the appellants.
For that reason we wish to review said findings with
the view of enlightening this court as to what -vve e·ontend
are the true facts as supported by the record.
With the first two Findings of :F,act the appellants
have no objection. Finding of F'act No. :j, which generally describes the nature of respondents' plant and equipInent, i~ probably oorrect insofar as it goes, but appellants object that it is not cornplc\te and therefore luisleading. It should he pointed out that \vhile respondents
have had a business on the property in question for sixSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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teen years, it was not until1951 that it became expanded
to the extent described in the said finding of fact. (R-145,
146 and 177 et seq.)
Finding of Fact No. 4 starts out by stating that
within a five hundred foot radius of the vVoods Cross
intersection is one of the most highly industrialized areas
of the state of Utah. This finding is unwarranted. It
is true that the record shows that there are certain industries within a five hundred foot radius of the Woods
Cross intersection, otherwise known as the intersection
of Fifth South and Eighth West Streets or Onion Street.
However, there is nothing in the record which indicates
the relative industri:alization of this particular section
of the state as eompared with other industrialized sections of the state of Utah, and such a finding is not based
upon any evidence in the record.
Finding of Fact 4 also finds that the property belonging to ap·pell·ants is located within the 500 foot radius
from the Woods Cross intersection. By application of a
ruler to defendants' Exhihi t 1, it \Vill be seen that the
nearest part of the saci.d property is over 575 feet from
the center of the Woods Cross intersection and appellants' home is over 600 feet therefrom.
It is uncontested, continuing with the Finding of
Fact No. 4, that Phillip·s op·erates certain loading racks
north of appellants' property, though according to respondents' own Exhibit 1, the distance from appellants'
home is closer to 440 feet than the 350 feet found in said
finding of fact.
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It \vas further found in Finding of Fact No. 4, that
the area in which the appellants live is highly industrialized and has been so for the past 16 years. This finding
of fact was not justified as a glance at defendant's Exhibit 6 and an exarnination of the record will show. In
defendant's Exhibit 6, the land to the west, to the south
and to the .east with the exception of the respondents'
intervening property, is all devoted to residential and
agricultural uses. It is true that the railroad does run
in front of appellants' property. 1-f.owever, west of the
railroad opposite appellants' hon1e and on either side
of the ra:ilroad running south, the land is devoted exclusively to residential and agricultural uses. While it
is true that there is some industrialization in the area
now existing, the record does not sustain the statement
that the present industrialization has existed for the
last 16 years. Any intimations contained in the record
regarding this indicate that the present industr~ialization
is a fairly recent development with tlu~ exception of the
Phillips plant.
The testimony and exhibits also shovv that the present industrialization is generously interlaced \\Tith agricultural and residential areas. ( -Defendants' Exhihit 6)
Finding of ~-,'act No. 5 states that the noises that
are eaused by the respondents in the pursuit ·of busine~s
are not unreasonable in view of the area in vvhich they
are located and are necessary to the conduct of husiness,
and that the respondents have acted carefully and with
due regard for the appell~ants and others. F'ul'ther it \vns
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found that the lights, both headlights and fixed lights,
do not interfere unreasonably with the health, comfort
and enjoyment of the appellants. It was further found
that there are no floodlights at the west of the garage.
It is contended that the findings of the court are not
founded in justice nor based upon the testimony presented
in the trial. The noises that are caused are unreasonable
in terms of the suffering of appellants as hereinafter
set forth, and the fact that they are necessary to the
conduct of the business is not a defense if, to use the
language of this court, the eonduct is "unlawful, unwarranted or unreasonable." This is the standard recently en1phasized ill the case of Can'non v. Neuburger,
( 1954) ____________ Utah ____________ 268 P. 2nd. 425.
Finding of Fact No. 5 further finds th·at
"At all times [the defendents] have had due
regard for the peace, quiet, and rest of the plaintiffs; that the plaintiffs are supersensitive to the
defendants' activities and that this supersensitiveness is oceasioned by the animosity between
the plaintiffs and the defendant, W. S. Hatch."
This finding of fact is wholly unfounded upon the
record. The plaintiff, Glen Hatch, denied that he felt
any enm'ity toward his brother and denied that he was
supersensitive to the noise made by his brother's operation. (R-40) Looking at the record, the trial court .could
not have made the fin,ding on anim·osity that it did \Yithout outside information which was not app:arent in the
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record. The r~cord itself negatives any sho\ving of animosity on the part of the appellants. There 1nay he son1e
suggestion to the effeet that the partition suit brought
by appellant Glen Hatch against his brother (R-39, 18:2)
is indicative of eerta.in anin1osity. This can hardly be
sustained and is not a proper inference from such fact.
Many brothers and sisters are involved in partition
suits when it is impossible for thelll to reach an agreement as to the use of land or ho\\" to divide land, and
the fact that such a suit is brought does not necessarily
entail animosity on the part of the rne1nhers of the farnily.
'ro presun1e that because the appellants are disturbed
by the noises create'd by respondents they are supersensitive is begging the question. It has been shown that
the appellants in this case have been subjected to rnuch
harassrnent and constant annoyance vvhich \vould cause
any reasonable person to react as they have reacted.
The testirnony by the appellants and }lrs. ~1oss clearly
show that they are not supersensitive vvhen they conlplain of these things. (See surnmary on p'ages 16 through
22, infra of this brief) On the contrary, it is highly probable that the complaint of these matters \\Ta~ held off for
a longer period of time than it 'otherwise rnight have been
were it not for the fact that two of the opposing partie~s in
this action are brothers. If there is any ani1nosi ty and
hard feeling, it appears to originate with the respondent
vV. S. }latch \vho adrnitted that he had 1uade certain
irnplied threats when appellants co1nplained to hi111 regarding the noise. (R.-192, 193) It is therefol'e ·contended
that th(~ finding h;r the trial rourt to the t}ff0et ''that the
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plaintiffs are supersensitive to the defendants' activities
and that this supersensitiveness is occasioned by the
animosity between the plaintiffs and the defendant \V.
S·. Hatch" is comp~letely without foundation and is based,
so far as can be gathered by appellants, upon information
obtained wholly ap·art from the record, which infor1nation
is comp~letely erroneous.
The finding that the respondents have at all times
had due regard for the peace, quiet, and rest of ap·pellants
is not true unless they have done everything in their
power to reduce, with all reasonably available facilities
at their command, the noise and annoyances to the barest
n1inimur.a. This they have not done. It is not enough
.that they reduce them to the extent that it is convenient
for the respondents; they must reduce the noises to the
very minimum which can be procured, even if it is necessary to spend more money in doing so than the appellants'
prop·erty is worth. In this connection we cite the case
of Quiwn vs. The American Spiral Spring wnd Manufacturing Co., 1928, 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855. 61 A.L.R.
918.
In that case the plaintiff bought a hon1e in an industrial area. There was a vacant lot adjacent thereto.
The defendant bought the vacant lot and built thereon a
manufacturing pl:ant, locating eertain heayy n1achinery
close to the plaintiff's property. The operation of the
machinery caused dan1age to the plaintiff's hon1e and to
the liveability of the home. The trial court refused to
grant injunctive relief. The appellate court said, in reversing the trial court ;
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"Defendants, however, g·ave no heed to plaintiff's rights. When they purchased the rear lot,
they were bound to know that while they could
construct their proposed plant at that place, and
could operate with the kind of 1na.chinery usual
in the business, they were nevertheless required
under the applicable legal principle above stated
to so locate and install that which they intended
to use as to do as little injury to the plaintiff
and his dwelling as was reasonably possible, consideTing the use to which the machinery \Vas to he
put, and the needs of the business. That is \vhere
they failed in their legal duty. Apparently they
thought that as their busin.ess u·a.s a lawful one,
w·hich they were entitled to carry on at tha.t place,
no just compla.int could be made if, also, they were
careful in conducting thei.r opera,tions. Such is
not the law. [Ernphasis added.]
"As a:lready stated they \vere still in duty
bound to so locate and install the heavy 1narhinery
as not to deprive plaintiff, \Vhen it was properly
operated, of the degree of quiet he had a right to
enjoy. Collirns vs. Wa.yne Iron Works, 227 Pa.
326, 76 Atl. 24, 19 Ann. Cas. 991. This they did not
do, though they kne-vv, a~s everyonP PlHP does,
that the noise and vibration ·eould have been
greatly minimized by plaeing the heavy lnaehinery :at the other side of their lot and that
this could have been done \Vi thout injury to any
one. It can still be ren1oved there \vith great
henefit to plaintiff, at a eost to the defendant of
son1e twelve thousand dollars and a ceasing of
operations for a few months while the· work is
being done. Defendants contend that the machinery was placed in its present position because it
was e:·: pected to result in a rnore rronornica1 use
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of the plant, due to the fact that it is easier there
to load and unload long heavy bars of steel and
iron, than would result if no -change wa:s made;
but this is no excuse for injury to the plaintiff.
(Citing cases.)
"As defendants are only required to rearrange the heavy machinery, it is a matter of no
moment, though evidently the court below thought
otherwise, that they wi'lllose more money in righting the wrong done than the plaintiff's property
is worth. This they should have consi'dered before
they did the :injury; the improper location o[ the
machinery was their own 'act, uninfluenced by the
plaintiff, and they have no right to put upon him
any loss by reason thereof. 14 R,.C.L. 359, 360.
Besides, 'where justice is properly administered,
rights are never measured by their mere money
value, neither are wrongs tolerated because it
may be to the advantage of the powerful to impose upon the "reak .... The rule is [always] the
same: "So use your own so as not to injure another." ' "
We contend that the trial court did not use this standard
when he made Finding of Fact No. 5 and therefore
erred in said Finding of Fact. Let us look at what exists
in the way of annoying activities.
The testimony shows the follow:ing:
Mr. Glen A. Hatch testified that the grease guns
1nake a noise like a series of firing guns, series of loud
noises and that \Vhen the gun is disconnected froin the
trucks it usually gives a loud squeal or noise that you
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
can hear all over the country, and the greasing goes on
pratically every night and every day, and that the respondents do this greasing whenever it pleases them.
(R-19) That they do their steam cleaning of trucks on
the outside of the shop building where there isn't any
cover, just south of the garage, causing a loud hissing of
steam constantly for hours at a time, so1netin1es during
the night time. (R-19, 20) That the defendants in the
changing of tires do a lot of pounding that goes on for
various lenghts of time-sometiines an hour, and that
they tune the diesel motors and let then1 run for long
periods of time causing a constant throb and vibration
that fills appellants' hon1e with noises and the odors of
the exhaust. The motors of the trucks run from an hour
or two to a few minutes and the motors are speeded up
and shut off and speeded up and shut off and this occurs
at all hours of the day and night. (R-20, 21)
That the operation prior to the acquisition of the
Phillips property wasn't bothersome but has been· since
said acquisition because of the increase in the ntm1ber of
units ·and business and the increased use of the garage
in night work; that the respondents use the shop for
night work every night in the vveek during the sunnnPr
season and fall, generally all night during the busy
season. ( P"21)
That the iten1s of equip1nent operated by respondent
are 25 or 30 feet long, some being s1naller, and have
C'apaci ties anywhere fron1 1500 to 3000 gallons, and
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some of the larger ones carry a load of 4500 gallons.
(R-22)
That ap·pellants cannot sit on their patio in peace
and quiet without hearing .the motors or pounding of
tires, even hearing them in their home when the doors are
closed and :also being able to hear racing motors and
pounding. That if you sit~down and listen to a diesel motor
throb for an hour it will certainly disturb you and m·ake
you very nervous; it disturbs your sleep and rest and
causes you to become nervous and worry when and how
long it is going to keep up·, when it is going to start and
when it is going to stop. It is on your mind constantly
"\vhen you are inside the house or out and yoru know any
minute one of the big motors will start up and buzz
around the yard. (R-22, 23) That the lights are on
inside the shop· building all night and shine directly into
appellants home through the window; that they are very
disturbing, making the home interior light up, and as
the light shines through the moving trees it causes a
moving shadow on the walls of the home; that the lights
appear ·as spotlights. (R-24)
That the trucks are turned around at a rapid speed,
faster than necessary, and with no regard to the noise
made; that they seem to start earlier in the morning on
·Sunday than other days and work all day greasing trucks,
changing tires and tuning motors, as 'Yell as on Sunday
nights. (R- 25, 26) At times they have the motors of
three or four trucks running at the same tin1e from an
hour to two hours both day and night, dist.urbjng the
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appellants even with the doors and windows of their
home closed. ( R.-28, 29)
That the respondents stacked everything they could
gather up it seemed like - junk of every 1nanner and
description which spilled over on to the appellants' property and was placed along the fence line between the appellants' and respondents' property; that this was cleaned
up within just a few days prior to the trial of the ease.
(R-27, 28)
The plaintiff Edith B. Hatch testified that the defendants started vvith a small business which appellants
did not expect \vould grow into what it is novv; that
they did not object because there wasn't interference with
their living then but as it grew on vvhich it had done the
past two years, that was when the noise and the trouble
started; it has doubled or rnore in the last tvvo ye·ars,
the increase being both night and day, and started \vith
the acquisition of the Phillips property. (R-74, 75, 76)
That prior to the last two years they operated th~
garage very little during the night time-not enough to
interfere with appell'ants; that the husiness is no\\' practically a 24-hour business night and day; that the noise
of the trucks, the hammering, stea1ning and cleaning of
the trucks 'and other noises 'disturb her~ that the noises
can be heard in any part of their honlP \vhether it is
closed or open, summer or winter; that 'vhen they are
busier the noise and disturbance is more; it is more in
'
the surn1ner
than winter. (R-76) That the doors to the
\Vork shop are open during the war1n \Vrathor~ rlosrcl jn
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the cold, hut you C'an still hear the noises with the doors
closed; that the noises that emit from the operation are
clearly audible in her bedroom, very much so, so 1nuch so
that she can't sleep at night; that there is the running of
the motors continuously and the hammering ·at night
time, it being exactly the same as in the day time, there
being no regard to night or day time. (R-77) That they
operate on Sundays from six o'clock in the morning and
all evening, there being continuous noise causing nothing
but eonfusion with noi'se, such continuous noise being
very wearing- "it hurts." (R-77)
There are fumes all the tin1e and the lights from the
shop keep her bedroom bright at night, bright enough so
that she can look over to her clock across the .room and
read exactly the time of day; that the lights reflect on the
mirror on the wall, causing two walls to light up bright.
It usually bothers her sleep, hut outside the home the
whole yard is lit up at night; that the noise causes her to
get up and 'valk around-to go back to bed-try to get
some rest-get up again and wonder how long the noise
is going to last. "You don't know - you hope it isn't
but it goes on." (R-78)
That they do not have any intention of selling
their home; that it was built for them to live in and they
expect to live there and that is what they want; that it had
been home to ap.pellants, that they had raised their fa1nily
there, that she had worked for 36 years for her home and
did not wish to give it up·, and that it would be impossible
to continue living there as a home under the present conditions; that you can't have your rest disturbed all the
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time-you can't take it; it breaks your health; you have
got to have your rest whether it is me or anyone else.
(R-80) That the constant noise and sound and fumes
and light coming fro1n the respondents' operation cause
her to become nervous and upset. (R-82)
Mrs. Ezra Moss testified that she visited the Glen
A. Hatch home quite frequently and that she was la.st in
their home about two weeks prior to the trial, arriving
about eight o'clock in the evening. That as soon as you
drive up the lane the lights are always on in some garage
and you can see very plainly the garage and that there is
work going on in it; that you would describe the lights
as flood lights it was so bright; that it appears that the
lights are on the outside the way they reflect the light to
you but that she had not been close to the building and
did not know whether they were inside or outside the
building. (R-90, 91) That she could hear the noise fro1n
the operation before coming into the living roon1 of the
~appellants' home, the noise she notices being a continual
pound, pound, pound, but she did not kno\v what was
being pounded and that even in the living roorn \vith the
windovvs closed, you still noticed the '"pound, pound,
pound, until you finally say, what in the world is the
pounding, that is the sensation you have." (R-91, 92)
~rhat she. stayed until after midnight, about 12 :30, and
the situation was practically the same vvhen she leftthey were still working, the lights \Vere still on. ~rhat the
living room is in the west portion of the horne; that on
other occasions when she visited the home the condition
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chinery and vibration and the noise of the machinery
that is going on "back there." That if you stay in the
home long it would annoy you and on a visit was very
noticeable. (R-9'2)
Mr. Frank Hughes, a witness for the respondents,
testified that in the shop. building there are seven lights
ill the south stall, two big lights and others in the middle
stall and ·eight lights in the north stall, they being 150 to
200 watts each. (R.-116, 117) This is a total of nineteen
lights and would mean a total of 2850 watts if the lights
were 150 watts each or 3800 watts if 200 watts each, which
lights are shining upon ap·pellants' home throughout the
night.
There is no question that these things cause great
annoyance. Do they constitute a nuisance~ Yes. The
resp-ondents can do a great deal to eliminate most of the
noise in order to alleviate the torment of the appellants
without permanently closing down the op·eration. It
may ·cost some money and time, but the ap·p·ellants are entitled to the proper enjoyment of their home. We refer
again to Quimm v. The American Spiral Spring amd Manufacturing Co., supra, wherein it was said that defendant
had the duty to so locate his equipment that it p·rotected
plaintiff to the maximum that he was entitled to be protected . We contend that this is also the law in this jurisdiction. Even assuming that appellants be held to be
living in the heart of an industrial district, which, in fact,
've most certainly deny, they are still entitled to a standard of quiet consistent with the most quiet operation of
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adjoining activities as is possible. The most quiet operation possible can be obtained by more than just telling
the employees of respondents to be quiet while on duty
at night. At the very least, an order should he issued
(a) designating -certain areas of restricted operation during certain hours, (b) ordering the moving or changing
of the location of the building or buildings which are
causing part of the nuisance, (c) imposing certain restrictions upon the use of lights and the direction in which
they may face, and others at the discretion of the court,
all of "\Vhich would not be inconsistent in the slightest
'vith the equitable rights of the pa.rties.
The testimony in the record shows that after this
suit was instituted but prior to the trial thereof, the respondents removed certain tires and trash 'vhich lined
the fence between the appellants' and the respondents'
property. ( R-27). This led the court to make Finding of
Fact No. 6 to the effect that the tires and trash are removed and that the property in question, that is, the respondents' property, is as sightly as can be expected
when considering the nature of the respondents' operation. The permanence of any such neatness, it is contended, should be insured by the issuance of an injunction including provisions for continuing such neatness,
inasmuch as it required the initiation of a court action
to secure even this concession.
Finding of Fact No. 7 states that the respondents
do not load oils and acids on their property, to which
finding we offer no objection. It also finds that the
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respondents' business compels night operations which are
conducted as carefully as possible so as not to disturb
the .ap·peH.ants, and do not create unnecessary noise.
T·his, we contend, is an unjustified finding of fact, inasmuch as there is no showing that the respondents could
not conduct their night operations, if such operations are
ne~cessary, at a further extremity of either their property or the property leased fro1n Phillips Petroleum
Company and further, so Jnove the position and location
qf their shop· so as to minimize the nuisance to ap·peH.ants.
The discussion of the Qui~ ca.se, supra, is applicable
here, as this finding of fact is really a corollary of Finding of Fact No. 5. We, therefore, take exception to Finding of F'act No. 7 for the grounds mentioned in the discussion of Finding of Fact No. 5 as well as the ones
Inentioned herein.
Finding of Fact Number 8 states that appellants
have watched respondents' business grow and yet have
taken no steps to impose any kind of legal restraint upon
said growth and that, further and notwithstanding these
facts, app,ellan ts extensively ren1ode'led their home in
1951, kno\ving that they were in an industrial area. Appellants take exception to this finding of fact for two reasons : (1) that the area is no rnore a highly industrialized
one tlian it is highly agricultural and residential one,
and ( 2) that the finding of fact is incon1plete in that it
leaves out certain very pertinent details and leaves an undeHirable implication with regard to certain other halfstated facts. It is true that the respondents' business
has been a growing one, but the fact is that it had grown
1
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as much in the two years preceding the trial of the ease
as in all the time before that. (R-145, 146 and 190) Prior
to 1951 it no doubt constituted an annoyance to plaintiffs, but no complaint was made, probably because one
brother will not complain legally of the other unless
forced to the limit. But increased annoyances to the appellants fro1n the use of the tremendously increased facilities and equipments of respondents, plus the roundthe-clock operation, came to constitute a nuisance "\vhich
appellants could not permit to continue and hence this
action to enjoin.
AppeUants wish to call attention to a well established
principle concerning nuisances, as set forth in 39 American Jurisprudence 4 72, Nuisances, Sec. 197 :
"As a rule, it is no justification for maintaining a nuisance that the party co1nplaining of it
came vo~untarily within its reach. Thus, according to the weight of authority the fact that a person voluntarily co1nes to a nuisance by moving
into the sphere of its injurious effect, or by purehasing adjoining property or erecting a residence
or building in the vicinity after the nuisance is
created, does not prevent hin1 fron1 recovering
damages for injuries sustained therefrom, or deprive him of the right to enjoin its maintenance,
especially where by reason of changes in the structure or business compla.ined of, the anrnoyance has
since been increased . . . I3ut \vhile priority of
occupation is not conclusive as to the existence of
a nuisance it is to be considered with all the evidence and' the inference drawn from all the facts
' in deterrnining whether the use of the
proved,
property is unreasonable." ( ernphasis added).
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"But the fact that one purchases a home in a
manufacturing district with p-roperty adjoining
that may be improved for manufacturing purposes
does not prevent his insisting that any such improvement shall he made with due regard to his
rights as a dweller in a manufacturing district."
The case of Benjamin et al v. Lietz, 1949, 116 Utah
476, 211 P. 2d 449 supports the general rule stated in
American Juris prudence, supra, with respect to the effect
of expansion of business. In this case, it was the increased use of a planing mil'l in a residential section after
6 :00 at night and a~l day Sunday that caused an injunction to issue. This resulted from the increased use of
the business and not the mere use of the business, in
and of itself lawful, which had been going on for many,
many years prior to the initiation of the law suit.
Further it should be recwlled that the ap·pellant Glen
A. Hatch was born and partly raised in the house he now
calls his home, the property concerned in this litigation.
Moreover, he vvas married and 1noved back into said
home in 1917. (R-2, 3) The refinery now owned by the
Phillips Petroleu1n Corporation was started by its predecessor, Wasatch Oill Co., in or around 1931 ( W asa.tch
Oil Co. v. Wade, 1936, 92 Utah 50, 63 P. 2d 1070). _A_t
the time when appellants moved into their pTesent home,
the entire area around, with minor exceptions, \Vas devoted to farming and agricultural pursuits. (R-3) Since
the installation of the oi~ refinery and subsequent expansion thereof, there has grown up some trucking industry
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ficance, as respondents contend and the findings of fact
imply, then the equities should lie with appe'llants.
If we follow the contentions of the respondents to
their logica~ conclusion, it may he seen that there is a
danger of giving industry more power than is granted
to the sovereign by the Constitution. If industry moves
into an area and maintains itself quietly for a number
of years, then, if respondents' contentions are valid, it
may operate any lawful business therein, without regard
for the surrounding area. If people have remodeled or
improved their homes- or property (and where do \Ve
draw the line at what constitutes remodeling or improving~) then they would be estopped fro1n complaining at
any expansion the industry might make, even though extensive depreciation to their property was involved. The
sovereign, in taking property by eminent domain, is required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States to pay for the damage
to the remaining property as well as for the property
taken. :Such would not be required of private industry,
should we accep-t respondents's position.
It is respectfully submitted that this Finding of Fact
be rewritten to exclude those facts not justified from
the testimony and to include all the facts pertinent to
the case and not just those pertinent to respondents'
theory of the case.
Finding of Fact number ten finds that respondents
did not cause or threaten to cause unreasonable noise,
but did everything possible to minimize the noise. This
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~as

an unwarranted finding from the testimony. We call
the court's attention again to Quiwn. v. A.mericam Spiral
Sp,rirng and Manufactu.ring Con~pany, (1928), 293 Pa""
152, 141 A. 85·5, 61 ALR 918, wherein much was r~quired
of. the defendants in order to assure the plaintiff 'Of the
most peace and quiet which he could expect under the
circumstanees. In the present case, the extent of the respondents' attem.pts to maintain quiet has been lin1ited
to or~ering Defendants' empiloyees to keep doors closed
(R-184) and not operating at night "n1ore than we have
to" (R-183). There is some suggestion that a certain
lane was abandoned and more property leased to Inini~ize noises, (R-182, et seq.), hut it haQ. been shown
earlier in the record that this was the result of the expansion of the business and caine before appellants n1ade any
real complaint to the conduct of the business. (R-17) In
<?tl~er words, res.pondents have moved their operation
only "\Vhen it suited the dictates of their business and
without regard for ap~pellants except as they might beneThe fact that they did not benefit is
fl.t incidentally.
.
shown by the record in this suit. It is respectfullY. subInitted that this finding of fact is not con1plete and is
misleading and therefore is not sufficient to justify denying the ·issuance of an order to abate that part of the
resp-ondents' operation which is a nuisance.
F'inding of Fact Number 11 is objected to on the
same grounds as Finding of Fact Number 10. No. 11
finds .that the respondents' operation is lawfully conducted with due consideration for the ap·pe'llants, and that
noises,. odors and lights are maintained at a 1ninimun1
.
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consistent with the respondents' operation, and further
that the maintenance and operation of the respondents'
business is not a nuisance to the plaintiffs nor does it
interfere with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property.
It is contended that the finding that there is no nuisance
is a conclusion of law and is improperly found here as a
finding of fact. It is further contended that, even accepting, arguendo, the contention that respondents conduct
their business with a minimum of noise under present
conditions, it does not follow, per se, that there is no
nuisance. We again refer the court to Quinn v. American
Spiral and Manufacturing Company, supra, "\vherein it
was said that just because disturbances are at a n1inimum
under present conditions was no reason for saying that
no nuisance existed but that the final test was the minimum disturbance that could be made with the rnost favorable conditions, frorn the point of view of the offended
party, without stopping defendants' operation altogether.
We also refer to the discussion and cases cited in the
next succeeding part of this argument.
Finding of Fact number 12 is to the effect that no
damages were shown with respect to the property of the
appellants or to their persons. We respectfully contend
this to be the result of an error con1mitted by the trial
court in excluding this evidence. We will discuss this
n1ore fully in the third part of this argurhent.
The thirteenth and final finding of fact is to the effect that the appellants' location in an industrialized
area has subjected them to noises, odors and lights and
similar annoyances· from the refinery, rai~Iroads, trnrks
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and small businesses, other than respondents', in the
neighborhood. To a certain extent this is true, but it is
not these other incidental noises that are the subject of
ap~pellants' complaint. To help justify this finding respondents may point to the testimony of the witness E.
B. Rawlins to the effect that he has lived in the next house
south from the home of the appellants and that he has
heard certain noises from the various activities in the
neiglrborhood, but that nevertheless he has made no
complaint thereof. This testimony was. elicited by the
respondents, no doubt to show that disturbances. other
than those produced by defendants do exist in the neighborhood. This. a.p·pellants did not deny. App·ellants further elaborate to say that if the only disturbances they
had to contend with were the ones discussed by Mr.
Rawlins in his testimony, this action wouid never have
been instituted. Unfortunately, app·ellants must put up
with much more than Mr. Rawlins and the difference lies
wholly "\vith the respondents' operation which immediately adjoins the property of the app-ellants, but is several hundred feet from the home of Mr. Rawlins, with an
orchard intervening. Respondents think it strange that
if appellants complain of the disturbances from respondents' operation they don't complain of the disturbances
from other businesse~s in the neighborhood. It is not
strange at all. The other businesses do not create the
disturbance to appellants any more than they do to 1Ir.
Rawlins, hut the sa1ne cannot be said of respondents.'
business as shown by testin1ony elicited by and from appellants during the trial.
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It can be seen fro1n the foregoing discussion that
there are several findings of fact which are not supported
by the testimony. It is respectfully requested that the
court re-exan1ine the record in the light of what has been
said hereinabove to determine whether the findings of
fact ~should be sustained or overruled and other findings
substituted therefor. It is a well established rule that
upo:n an appeal in a case where equitable relief has been
sought, the appellate court may review not only the application of the rules of law, but may '\veigh the evidence
'\Vi th a view to examining the findings of fact in the lower
court. We respectfully contend that the substantial
weight of the evidence is contrary to the findings of the
trial court, and that an actionable nuisance does obtain in
this case as shown by the record.
It is therefore respectfuily submitted that the findings of fact in this particular case should he along the
lines or substantially like the ones hereafter suggested:
1. That the plaintiffs are the ovvners and in possession of the real property, including the in1proven1ents
thereon, particularly described in plaintiffs' con1plaint ~
that said property is located in Woods Cross, Davis
County, Utah, and adjacent to '\vhat. is con1monly called
"Onion Street".
2. rrhat the defendant W. S. IIatch Company is a
L_:tah corporation engaged in transportation of oils and
acids by rneans of tank trucks and trailers and has 20
to 50 ernployees, depending upon the season of the year;
that the defendant WillardS. Hatch is the President and
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Manager of W. S. Hatch Company and is the owner of
the real property adjacent to and immediately north of
the real property of the p·laintiffs deserrbed in plaintiffs'
complaint; that the plaintiff, Glen A. Hatch and the defendant Willard S. Hatch are brothers.
3. That more than 16 years prior to this case, the
defendant WiUard S. Hatch co1nmenced an oil distribution business which steadily expanded through the ensuing years until at the p·resent time defen·dants conduct
a large oil and acid transportation and distribution business on the premises of the defendant W. S. Hatch;
that a garage ·and service building 'is located on the ·
premises of the defendant W. S.- Hatch· at a point approximating 225 feet northeasterly from p·laintiffs' home;
that said garage and service building is used in the
maintenance, repairing and servicing and cleaning o:f the
tank trucks., semi-trailers, trailers and other equipment
owned and maintained by the defendanst in their transportation and distribution business·; that the defendant
W. S. Hatch Comp-any at all times since about June, 1950
has had under lease property belonging to Phillips Petroleum Comp·any and ;located adjacent to and imm·e-diate1-y: east of the said garage and real property of the
defendant W. S. I-Iatch; that since the acquisition of the
aforementioned Phillips Petroleum property the defendants' op·eration has materially increased, the equipment
belonging to said defendants having been doubled since
'that time and substantial imp-rovements having been
made upon the real property of defendant; that during
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the busy season of the year defendent's operation continues unabated for 24 hours a day, and all day Sunday;
that the said real property including the leased property
is also used for parking and storing equipment belonging
to the defe·ndants.
4. That the area in which plaintiffs live is devoted
to residential and agricultural, and industrial purposes;
that the industry which immediately surrounds plaintiffs'
home consists of a railroad whiCJh runs North and South
at a distance of 195 feet to the West of 'said house with
a siding which runs pavallel with said railroad at a distance of 175 feet to the west of said house and defendants
business which bounds plaintiffs on the North and East;
that to the north of the Woods Cross intersection, and
over 700 feet from Plaintiffs' property, the PhiNips
Petroleum Company operates and maintains a large bulk
plant, a refinery and "cat cracker" having a crude oil
capacity of from 10,000 to 12,000 barrels a day; that
Phillips Petroleurn 'Company also owns, operates and
maintains two racks for loading tank trucks vvith road
oil, diesel fuel and light fuel oils and that said facilities
(except for an intervening lot approxiina.ting 50 feet in
width) are adjacent to defendants' place of business and
immediately North thereof; that from the plaintiffs' horne
to the said loading racks is approxirnately 440 feet and
that from 47 to 100 tank trucks a day are loaded at such
racks; that some trucks from this loading platform travel
along Onion Street but not enough to be a reat annoyance; that during a 24 hour period, normally about 42
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trains travel .North or South past plaintiff's home; that
each of said trains whistles for the Woods Cross crossing; that at the point where Onion Street intersects the
rfl.ilroad tracks said tracks are equipped with bells and
flashing lights for warning traffic; that the total elapsed
time t~at trains are in a position to bother residents in
the. area does not exceed two hours, a day, spread out
over a twenty-four hour period; that there are other garages besides respon-dents in the areta but that they operate -off Fifth South Street rather than Eighth West
Street, the nearest one being 49·5 feet from plaintiffs'
home; that the portio~ of Onion Street adjacent to and
immediately in front of plaintiffs' home is traveled both
day and night by an average of only 5 plus trucks per
h-our; that the area across from the railroad tracks to
the W es,t and on either side of said tracks to the ·south
from plaintiffs' property and to the South of Plaintiffs'
property and to the East of plaintiffs' prop-erty, excluding that prop·erty owned or leased by defendants, and the
property interlacing the industrial plants within a 500
foot radius of the Woods Cross intersection is devoted to
agricultural uses; that all of these many activities
characterize the ar_ea in which the prop~erty of the plaintiffs i'S

1oc~ted

and that this

as residential, agricultural and industrial,

characteriz~tion

has been relatively recent,

the area formerly being p.rimarily agricultural and residential.
5. T hat the tires, tubes, old lumber, batte.ries, etc.,
of which plaintiffs complain were removed from the
1
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property of said defendant8 only after this suit was instituted, and that defendants have given plaintiffs no
cause to complain in this regard from that time up to the
time of the trial; that it required the institution of a la;w
suit to secure removal of said trash.
6. That the- nature of the defendants' business. is
such that during the busy season \Vhich extends from
April until November, it is operated for 24 hours a day
during which ti1ne the servicing and repairing of motor
ve-hicles and other routine- items are carried on regardless
of the tin1e of day or night.
7. That the plaintiffs have observed the carrying
on of defendants' business on a relatively small scale for
a number of years without legal complaint because said
conduct did not hamper plaintiffs' enjoyment of their
home and property; ~hat the increased use of defendants'
property has caused 1nuch discomfort to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs extensively remodeled their home in 1951 with
the view of ·making it more liveable; that defendants'
operations have doubled since that time.
8. That the operation and maintenance of the business of the: defendants referred to in plaintiffs' con1plaint
is performed in a lawful, but otherwise annoying manner; that said annoyances could he reduced and in many
cases eliminated by defendants moving their shop position and restricting the use of the equipment to the area
furthest away from plaintiffs' home; that as th'e property
stands and is being used, it constitutes an unreasonable
and un\varranted use of the property with respect to
plaintiffs' rights as landowners.
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9. That the home of plaintiffs in its pre'Sent location
h·as been subjected to noises, odors and lights originating
from some of the industries in the area, but these minor
annoyances have not been of the proximity, severity or
continuous nature that those: originating with defendants
have been.

10. ·That s1nce 1951 defendants' increased use of
the property adjoining plaintiffs has doubled, causing
plaintiff much annoyance~ mental anguish, discomfiture
and a lessening of enjoyment by piaintiffs of their home;
that said annoyances consist of high power lights in almost constant use which glare upon plaintiffs' home, of
hammering and pounding and squealing and hissing
which creates loud and unusual noises, of running of motors and engines at all hours, causing noise, vibration and
dbnoxious fumes to enter piaintiffs' prop·erty; that such
use by defendants of their prop·erty is unrea'sonable:·and
unwarranted under -all the circumstances.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO
NUISANCE EXIS'TS OR EXISTED, WHICH ERROR WAS
BASED UPON A MISCONCEPTION OF THE LAW AND A
MISINTERPRETA·TION O·F THE FACTS AS BROUGHT OUT
BY THE EVIDENCE; AND THEREFO·RE THE TRIAL
COURT FURTHER ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
APPELLANTS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

The law of nuisance is one largely of balancing the
equities and degrees of annoyance in favor of both
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parties. There are t"\vo types of nuisances ; nuisances per
se and nuisances per accidens. Nuisances per se are those
nuis.ances or activities which, regardless of location or
care of operation, are always the subject of injunctive
relief; and to plead and prove that such an activity
exists is .sufficient in and of itself to entitle the pleader
to relief. It is not contende~d that the nuisance complained
of herein falls into this category.
Nuisances per accidens are those nuisances which
occur not because the activity claimed to be a nuisance
is unlaw'ful, but because the ·manner in wh~ch it is conducted or the location wherein it is conducted or some
other factor which may or may not be inherent therein
is sufficient to make the activity a nuisance to the pleader. This is the type of nuisance that is complained of
here.
The word "nuisance" as used in cases, legal texts
and encyclopedias is often a misused term. Sometimes
it is meant as a mere annoyance and the term then is
divided into two groups which are said to he "actionable
nuisances'' or ''non-actionable nuisances''. At other
times , the word ''nuisance'' as used in a legal sense
rneans that annoyance or interference for 'vhich there is
some legal or equitable remedy. As used hereinafter,
the latter use of the word shall be ·mainta~ned. It should
be borne in mind, ho"\vever, that son1e of the citations
will not observe the same niceties of expression.
In Utah the courts have evolved some modification
'
of the doctrine, so "\vell known at Common Law, that
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one _should "so use his own so as not to injure another."
Any modification that has occurred, howeveT, has been
limited· to the balance of the equities. What constitutes
balancing the equities~ This court, as late as the case of
Cannon v. Neuberger, 1954, 268 P. 2d 425, has maintained
a standard that no person may have an injunction for the
abatement of a nuisance, unless the use of the land or
activity to be enjoined is "ttnlawful, unreasonable. or
unwarranted.''
·But vvhat constitutes such unlawful, unreasonable
or. unwarrante-d activity~ Is it sufficient to say that if
the activity is lawful and conducted in accordance with
good . busriness operating procedure there can be no
nuisance~ We respectfully contend that such is not the
case.· We wish to call attention to the. discussion of this
and a related problem in 61 ALR 924 at 932. The annota~ ·
tion discusses the various views regarding the comparatiy~. injury

doctrine and quotes from the case of Brede

v. Minnesota

Cru~she~d

Ston-e Co., (1919), 143 Minn. 324

173- NW 805, 6 ALR 1092 as follows :
''If the injury complained of is caused by the
operation of a lawful business, carried on in a
~district given over to kindred classes of business,
and the injury is only ~such as naturally flo,-;·s
from the operation of the business of that character, an injunction will not be granted if it vvould
· entail a serious injury to the -defendant or to the
public as compared to the injury complained of
by the plaintiff. This is comm'Only referred to as
the 'eompar,ative injury doctrine'. The cas~~~
in which this doctrine has been given effect are
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collected in the note to Bristol v. Palmer, 31 LR.A.
(N.S.) 881-893 and in 20 R. C. L. 480. Other
authorities adopt the ancient doctrine that the
rights of habitation are superior to the rights of
trade, and, whenever they .conflict, the rights of
trade must yield to the primary or natural right.
They hold that, if a lawful business is ·conducted
in such a 1nanner as to offend or interfere materially with ordinary physical comfort, measured
not by the standards of delicate sensibilities and
fastidious habits, but by the standards of ordinary
people, a permanent injunction should be granted.
The cases so holding are also collected in the note
to Bristol v. Palmer, 31 LRA (NS) 888, and it is
said that this doctrine is supported by the greater
weight of authority. We are of the opinion that
the latter is a better doctrine, and ·that ordinarily
it should be applied in determining whether an
injunction should he granted or denied in eases
such as this. ' '

In America;n Smelting and Refining Co. v. Godfrey,
1907, CCA. 8th Cir.) 158 F. 225, certain farmers located
close to the refining plants of the defendants sued to
enjoin the operation of the smelters and refining plants
on the ground that their operation was doing very serious
dan1age to a widespread agricultural area in the Salt
Lake valley. This claim of damage was largely substantiated but the defendant claimed th3Jt their industry was
an important and significant one in the state of Utah,
that tl1Py hi red a number of people and contributed substantially to the economy of the state. They contended
that to enjoin them \Vould cause much more harm to 1the
public than failure to enjoin \\ronld cause to the plaintiffs.
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The court did not agree with this contention, but said
further:
"However that may be, we do not think the
fact that an actual injury resulting from the violation of a right is small, and the interest to be
affected by an injunction is large, should weigh
against the interp,osition of preventative power
in equity, when it is clear that on one hand a right
is violate~d an~d on the other a wrong committed.''
An injunction was issued in this case which made
provision for certain remedies to be introduced into the
operation of Defendan~ts' plants.
A later case evidently reflects another attempt to
enjoin the same industry. Anderson v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 1919, D.C. Utah, 265 F. 928. This
case involved a question of fact as to whether the defendant smelters issued so much sulphur dioxide into the
atmosphere that it was harmful to the crops. The court
diS'cusses this fact at great length and points out the
scientific developments in the industry \Yhich have diminished such emissions sin·ce the Godfrey case, supra,
was handed down.

Judge Tillman D. Johnson, then

District Judge, came to the conclusion that, \Yhile he did
not want to completely enjoin the operation of the defendant smelters, he felt that more could he done to cut down
on the ·emission of harmful gases. Judge Johnson required defendants to explore the possibility of reducing
further the sulfurous emissions and shoul~d they fail to do
so he said he \Yould enjoin the entire operation.
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This .attitude on the part of the courts has continued
down to the present day and manifests itself again in the
case of Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 1950, Utah, 224 P. 2d
1037. In that ca:se the county operated a gravel pit and
rock crusher adjacent to the premises of plantiffs. Upon
suit to enjoin the operation of the gravel pit, it \Vas contended that the public good outweighed private rights in
this caBe. This court, finding that the gravel pit would
be just as effective if located else\vhere, affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the County move to a new loca~
tion, saying that public good did not outweigh private
rights in such a cas·e.
These cases show that to protect a right that has
been invaded, courts will go to great lengths even vvhen
the right protected is of a lesser pecuniary value than the
right enjoined.
Appellants have shovvn what the facts are surrounding this particular case and have shoV\rn the standards
which the ·Courts use in determining "Whether a given activity is a nuisance and wha~t can be done to minimize a
nuisance. There can be no doubt but what the activities
of the respondents constitute a grave annoyance to 1he
appellants, and this the respondents only incidentally
try to deny. Ra~ther than deny the existence of the factors
which, singly and collectively, make up the nuisanee, they
rely upon certain defenses or justifications as follows:
(a) Respondents' business is conducted in a lavvful,
modern and efficient manner;
(b) The noises caused by respondents are neces~~arily inc-ident to the operation of their business~
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(c) Th·e business is conducted in an in~dustrial area,
and appellants' home is in the same area; and
(~d)

The appellants were aware of respondents'
business as early as 1937, and yet, notwithstanding that
fact and the fact that there are other businesses and industries in the area, they extensively remodeled their
house in 1951.
Taking these defenses one by one, we ·can start with
the defense that because respondents conduct their business in a lawful, modern and efficient mann·er, they can
cause these annoyances to appellants with impunity.
The case of Benjamin -et al v. Lietz, (1949) 116 Uta'h
476, 211 P. 2d 449 is ;a good answer to this contention.
~

In that case, this court affirmed the lower court's
granting of an injunction, enjoining the operation of a
planing mill business during certain hours on week days
and all day on Sllnday. The defen·dent owned and operated a planing mill at 2032 South lOth East Street in
Salt Lake City. The planing mill had existed since approximately 1900. Prior to 1944 or 1945, the planing mill
was enclosed in a fram·e building, but in 1944 or 1945, the
·defendant erected a cinder block building some 30 feet
wide by 60 feet long, immediately to the rear of the frame
building and adjoining it. In 1947 the defendant cons(tructed a concrete apron extending along the s·outh and
west si,des of the building, and placed th·ereon certain
equipment and machinery used in connection 'vith the
planing mill. Enclosed within the new ·building was some
of the machinery theretofore used in th.e frame building,
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some ~machinery \vhich replaced machinery from the old
frame building, and some new machinery not designed
as replacernent for existing m~aehinery but rather as
additional machinery. The potential horsepower of machineTy inst,alled prior to 1943 was 125, and the present
potential at the time of trial was 149¥2. The expansion
of the mill began in 1943 when the defendant re·ceived
certain government contracts for boxes during the war.
Plaintiffs were residents near the planing mill, some
of whom were property ovvners, and others not. They
complained of increased activity in and around the planing mill of recent years, commencing vvith 1943, both
during daylight hours and extending into the night, and
all day Sundays, which interferred \vith ~their property
enjoyment, rest and peace of mind.
The Court held that prior to 1943, the defendant had
not made ~a practice of operating after 6:00 o'clock P.M.,
and when he did -operate after that hour that it was only
done in a manner that did not diS'turb nearby residents.
The situation \vas similar all day on Sundays. The
Court further found that after 1943 the operation of the
planing mill during ihe evening and night hours and on
Sundays resulted in loud and unusual noises at hours
\Vhen the mill had not theretofore been used; that these
noises were of sufficient intensity to make normal conversa·tions difficult for plaintiffs in their homes and interferred with sleep and caused plaintiffs considerable discomfort.
This court approved the lower Court's findings upon
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the evidence, and in answer to the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action
in their complaint, stated at page 479:
"Appellant takes the position that the plaintiffs failed to state a·cause of action in their complaint. This contention is without merit. The
eomplaint in substance follows the complaint tested in Thompson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153
P. 2d 665, which was held to be sufficient in that
case. That appellant's business was a 'lawful business' in no way affects this holding, since a lawful b,usiness may be operated so as to constitute
a nuisance. Thompson v . ..._t\.nderson, supra; and
Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n., 105 Utah 446,
142 p. 2d 670."
The case of Thompson v~ Anderson, 1944, 107 Utah
331, 153 P. 2d 665, referred to in the B enja.min case,
supra, also sup~ports the rule that lawfulness of operation
is not a defense. In that case the defendant-appellant
con1plained that their demurrer to the complaint should
not h·ave been overruled because, to use this court's summariza ti'On of the eon ten tion and its answer thereto,
(page 334)
"there is no complaint that defendant',s business
is not a lawful business, and that the sounds which
annoy the plaintiffs are not unusual and not the
ordinary sounds emanating from such a business
as defendant is conducting. But even sounds nor.mally inherent in the nature of a business 1nay
under some circumstances constitute a nuisance.
In Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n., 105 Utah 446,
142 P. 2d 670 at 674, it was not alleged or shown
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that the noises of which complaint was made vvere
any but the usual noises attendant upon a carnival.
The projected business was lawful had in fact
been speeially licensed by the city e~uncil in past
years, and yet we affirn1ed the judgment enjoining the holding of the carnival in front of the
plaintiff's property."
In this same vein, we wish to cite 39 Am. Jur. 323,
"Nuisances", Para. 43:
"A business which is la-\vful in itself may become a nuisance, either because of the locality in
which
.
. it is carried on or because it is conducted
In an Improper manner.
"The owner of property has a right to conduct
thereon any lawful busines~s not per se a nuisance,
as long as the business is so conducted that it will
not unreasonably inconvenience a neighbor in the
reasonable enjoy1nent of his property. But every
business, however lawful, must be conducted with
due regard to the rights of others, and no one
has a right to erect and maintain a nuisance to the
injury of his neighbor even in the pursuit of a
lawful trade, or to conduct a business on his own
land in such a way as 'vill be injurious or offensive
to those residing in the vicinity or those traveling
on an adjoining high,vay.
"A trade or business la,vful in itself becomes
a nuisance when from the situation, its inherent
qualities or the manner in which it is conducted,
it causes a material injury to the property of another, interferes 'vith his con1fort and enjoyment,
injures the health of those living in the vicinity,
or interferes with their ordinary physical comfort, measured by the habits and feelings of ordinary people. It is not necessary that life or health
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be endangered; it is sufficient if the business produces that which is offensive to the senses, and
which renders the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. The mere fact, however, that a
business is objectionable to others, or that property in the immediate neighborhood may be adversely affected by it, is not sufficient ground for
an injunction. All persons hav-e t'he right to irnsist
that a business in any degree offensive or darngerous to them shall be carried on with such improved mewns arnd .appliances as e:xperi.ence and
science may suggest or supp.Zy, arnd with such
reasonable care as m.ay preveVfl).t unJYt.ece.ssary inconvenience to them. By such care and improved
methods and appliances, many occupations that
formerly were regarded as nuisances beeause of
their-annoyance to the senses may now be carried
on in even populous neighborhoods without of-·
fense to anyone. However, proof of negligence is
not essential in cases of this kind; and a person
carrying on a business 1nay be liable for n1aintaining a nuisance although he uses the most approved
methods and appliances in conducting it, and
although the annoyances complained of are ordinary incidents of such a business when properly
conducted.'' (Emphasis 'added.)
And in 39 Am. Ju.r. 327, Par. 45, it is said:
"The law takes care that lawful and useful
business shall not be put a stop to on account of
every trifling or imaginary annoyance, such as
may offend the taste or disturb the nerves of a
fastidious or over-refined person. But, on the
other hand, it does not allow anyone, whatever
his circumstances or conditions may be, to be
driven fron1 hjs home, or to be compelled to live
in it in positive discomfort, although caused by
lawful and useful business ·carried on his vieinity."
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And Page 341, Par. 58:
"As in other cases, the fact that a business
causing the nuisance is carried on in a careful and
prudent manner, and that nothing is done by those
managing it that is not a reasonable and necessary incident of it, does not constitute a defense."
It may be seen from these excerpts and citations that
the defense of performance in a lawful, mode·rn and efficient manner is not a valid one if other conditions which
cause annoyance .exist.
Coming to the second defense, that the noises caused
by the respondents are necessarily incident to the operation of their business, it may be seen that much that was
said with respect to the other defense will also be applicable here. Especially is this true of Thompson v. And:er-

son, supra, where it was said that "even sounds normally
inherent in the nature of a business may under some circumstances constitute a nuisance," citing Brough v. Ute

Stampede Ass'n., 1943, 105 Utah 446, 142 P. 2d 670.
In the Brough case the defendant for some years past
had run, adjacent to plaintiff's

proper~ty,

a carnival \vhich

had been specially licensed by the city council. The trial
court granted an injunction against the operation of the
carnival, and this court affirmed, in effect saying that the
fact that a business is lawful and that the noises which
emanate therefrom are necessarily incident to the business and normal therein is of no consequence if there
indeed is so much annoyance as to constitute a nuisance.
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To the same effect is the case of Roukovitna v. IslO/YI)d
Farm Creamery Co., .19·24, 160 ~linn. 335, 200 N.W. 350,
38 A.L.R. 1502, in which case the plaintiff resided in a
residential district that abutted on an alley to the rear
of a business street upon which a creamery was being
conducted.
years

~before

The creamery .had been established many
the plaintiff purchased the p·roperty. Never-

theless, the Court enjoined the loading of milk trucks and
the operation of an ice crushing machine,

unles~s

muffled,·

during the hours ordinarily devoted to sleep. On page
351 of the Northwest Reporter, Vol. 200, it is said:
"The contention is also that, since defendant
is conducting a lawful and useful business no ·
more noisily than is ordinarily incident to its
proper conduct, and at such period of the night
as is absolutely necessary in that business, no
injunction ·should issue, especially since plaintiff
acquired his building long after defendant 'vas
established there. The contentions urged are all to
be considered. It is true that the character of the
business sought to be interfered with, its exten. siveness, its useful!less to the public, the noises,
odors, and disturbances necessarily attending its
conduct, the condition and use of the surrounding
property, the relative hardship as between the
parties to the litigation, and who was first upon
the ground, are to be given due weight by the chancellor. But still, where it is found that a nuisance
within the definition of the cited statute exists
and.seriously interfered with another's enjoyment
of life and property, it should be abated~ especially so where, a.s here, the superior rights of habitation over business or trade rights invoke relief."
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Thus it can be seen that just because the noises are
normal to and necessary incidental to the business is no
excuse for maintaining a nuisance.
The respondents also claim that because they are located in an industrial area it is sufficient justification
for maintaining a nuisance with respect to the property
of the appellants. First we should like to point out that
the record and testimony do not support the contention
that this is an industrial neighborhood any more than
it is a residential or argicultural neighborhood. Neither
type of land use has attained sufficient priority in the
area to be able to dominate the other. However that may
be, we contend that the law is such that it is no defense
to a charge of maintaining a nuisance that there are other
similar annoyances in the neighborhood or that the area
is an industrial one. Perhaps the leading Utah case in
support of this contention is Lu.dZow v. Colorado A.rnimal
By-Products Co., 1943, 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 347. In
that case it was contended that the odors emitted from
defendant's animal by-products plant did not constitute
a nuisance due to the fact that the plant was located in
an industrial rather than an agricultural district. The
defendant in that case pointed out that within a radius
of several miles from the plant there were in existence,
or had been in existence, factories and industries which
rendered the area an industrial rather than an agricultural one, pointing out the existence of ( 1) a sugar factory; ( 2) a pea vinery; (3) two railroads ; (4) a flour
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1ng chutes adjoining each railroad; (7) wool loading
platforms; (8) a local brickyard; ( 9) livestock feeding
yards; and ( 10) livestock loading pens on both railroads.
Defendants also claimed that there were other smells
and odors that were obnoxious in the area, and that the
smells caused by the defendant's plant were mere incidents of the industrial area.
However, the court

~aid,

at pages 229 and 230:

"We also must reject the argument that the
existence of some of the facilities pointed out by
counsel for defendants, made the region an industrial rather than an agricultural area; although
in view of what we have said, the fact that a region actually may be industrial does not justify
the creation with impunity of odors or stenches
to an excessive degree which unreasonably annoy
others in the legitimate use of their properties or
in their occupations, especially when such conditions depreciate the value of other properties in
such area. The evidence sho,vs that the sugar factory; pea vinery, stock-feeding yards and loading
platforms are essential to the marketing of agricultural products and livestock. The region consists principally of farms on which there are
homes and other buildings characteristic of rural
life. In most instances the farmers .and livestock
raisers reside on their far1ns."
The court further held that the fact that an industry
might serve a useful purpose or produce com1nercial
commodities did not warrant its location at a place which
1nerely suited the· convenience of the o'vner or operator
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in utter disregard for the effect it has on the value or
enjoyment of other properties; and that the fact that
there might already exist conditions that are obnoxious
in the area did not -create a license for the establishment
of other or more offensive conditions.
On page 230 of the Utah report of the case the court
states:
"When an industry is of such a character that
it produces foul odors, those who are responsible
for its operation have the duty to place it where.
it will not result in injury to the property of
others. The mere fact that there may already exist in the area a condition which may be obnoxious
to some persons, does not create a license for establishment of other more offensive conditions."

In QU!inm v. The America.n Spiral Spring and Mwnufacturing Co., (1928), 293 Pa. 152, 141 A. 855, 61 A.L.R.
98, the court granted an injunction to prevent a manufacturer from continuing his business as it then stood
without making drastic changes in its construction in
order to save the plaintiff's home and his enjoyment
thereof. This was done in spite of the fact that plaintiff
lived in the heart of an industrial and manufacturing
area.
The New Mexico court has fairly recently made a
statement to the same effect, when it said:
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"And it is also clear that it is no justification
for Inaintaining a nuisance tha.t other persons
maintain similar nuisances or tolerate acts
amounting to a nuisance in the vicinity. See 39
An1. J ur., 300, Sec. 18." Barrett v. Lopez, 1953?
N.M., 262 P. 2d 981.
r~Phis

principle has been set forth in the citation fron1
39" Arn. Jur.; 323, Nuisances, Sec. 43, supra, and also in
17 ALR 2d 1280 :
"Par. 8. EXISTENCE OF SIMILAR CONDITION:S IN THE AR.EA.
"Generally, the creating or maintaining of a·
nuisance is not justified or excused by the fact
that other persons maintained similar nuisances
in the vicinity. Hence, even though the area in
which the rendering or bone boiling is carried on
is predominantly industrial, or occupied by other
establishments of equal objection, it has been held
that such facts do. not justify the creation of a
nuisance within the area by sueh animal rendering." (citing cases, including Ludlow v.· Colorado
Animal By-Prodttcts Co.)
39 Am. Jur., 325, Nuisan·ce's Par. 44:

"It has been said that in the eye of the law
no place can be convenient for the carrying on of
a busines~s which is a nuisance and causes substantial injury to the property of another. But the
locality and surroundings are to be taken into
· consideration in determining whether a business
or an industrY
.
. is so conducted as to constitute a
nuisance as a matter of fact.
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39

Am. JUAr.

326:

"That a neighborhood is devoted to some extent to industry does not authorize one to conduct
his business in such a manner as to interfere with
the right of property owners to the clean comfort
of their residences. One constructing a manufaCturing plant adjoining a home located in a manufacturing district must so locate and install that
which he in tends to use so as to do as little injury
to the adjoining dwelling and its owner as is reasonably possible, considering the use to which
his machinery is to be put and the needs of th'e
business."
It can be seen from the foregoing citations that the
fact that a business is conducted in an industrial area
adjacent to a residence is no excuse for justification for
causing undue, unreasonable or unwarranted interference
"\Vith those who are entitled to enjoy the re,sidence as a
home.
It is said that the appellants were aware of the respondents' business as early as 1937; and yet, notwithstanding the fact there are other businesses and industries in the area, they extensively re1nodeled their hom~
in 1951. First of all we wish to emphasize the fact that
it is not the mere existence of respondents' business
which constitutes the alleged nuisance; it is the expansion of that business, which is all out of proportion to the
conduct of the business in 1937 until 1951, that brings
about this clain1. It is the expansion of the busines~s from
1951 that has caused the great amount of annoyance and
discornfort to the plaintiffs. However, we contend that,
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even accepting defendants' contention that plaintiffs
"1noved into the nuisance," this is no defense if, in fact,
the defendants are conducting a nuisance. 'Ve cite from
the annotation beginning 167 A.L.R. 1364 concerning
''coming to a nuisance" as a defense or operation as an
estoppel. At page 1366 the annotation says:
''Some courts have expressed the view that
while priority of occupation is no defense, it is a
factor which may be considered in determining
the character of the locality leading to the deterInination of the reasonableness of the defendant's
use of his property. A number of courts have
emphasized the fact of tl1e priority of the objectionable condition without specifically deterinining the singular conclusiveness of this factor as a
defense; but it is apparent that where it is found
that a thing, business, or occupation is not a nuisance because, in view of the locality or surroundings, it constitutes a reasonable use of the property, the question of whether the complainant
came to the nuisance, or the nuisance came to the
-complainant is of no importance.
II. \TIEvV THAT PRIORITY OF NUISANCE
IS N·O DEF·ENSE: :.\fAJORITY RULE
a.

IN GENERAL: Actions by individuals
affected

While there are a few cases 'vhich support
a contrary view it has been held or recognized in
an overwhehning majority of cases that 'vhere
property is so utilized as to constitute a public
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or private nuisance, the fact that an individual
thereafter purchases or occupies property in an
area affected by the nuisance will not defeat his
right to its abatement or the recovery of damages due to its continuance since the fact that th.e·
complainant 'came to a nuisance' does not constitute a defense or an estoppel nor justify the continued operation of the· nuisance."
It would therefore seem that even should the appellants be held to have "moved into a nuisance" that it is
still no defense. We respectfully suhrnit, however, that
such was not the case and that the nuisance rnoved to the
appellants, they having lived there since 1917, some 20
years prior to respondents' first steps in the business.
Noise in and of itself rnay be a nuisance. 3.9 Anz. Jur.,
330 Para. 47:
"Generally, noise is not a nuisance, per se,
but it may he of such a character as to constitute
a nuisance in fact, even though it arises from the
operation of a factory, industrial plant, or other
lawful business or occupation." (Citing many
cases in foot note.)
.A.nd at page 331:
"Noises which lnJure the health of persons
residing in the vicinity are regarded as nuisances,
and so are noises of such character and intensity
as unreasonably interfere with the comfort and
enjoyrnent of private property, although no actual
physical injury to the health of the complaining
party or his family is shown."
"No one is entitled to absolute quiet in the
unjoyment of his property; he may only insist
upon a degree of quietness consistent with the
standard of comfort prevailing in the locality in
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which he dwells. The location and the surroundings must be considered, since noise which
amounts to a nuisance in one locality may be entirely proper in another. The character and magnitude of the industry or business complained of,
and the manner in \vhich it is conducted must also,
be taken into consideration, and so must the character and volume of the noise, the time and duration of its occurrance, the number of people affected by it, and a:ll the facts and circmnstances
of the case."
The time when a noise is made must be taken into
consideration. 39 Am. Jur., page 334. Par. 51:
"Time when made. -The time when a noise
is n1ade is to be taken into consideration in deterruining whether or not it is a nuisance. Thus,
noises made at night during the usual hours of
sleep may be a nuisance, although the same or
greater noises during the day would not be . And
noises made on Sunday may constitute a nuisance
although they would not be such if made on \Veek
day."
See also J(obielski v. Belle Isle East Side Cream,ery
Company, 222 :Niich. 656, 193 N.W. 214, 31 A.L.R. 183,
where the noise of a. crea1r1ery in a residential district at
night was restrained after giving reasonable time to
avoid th·e nuisance.
Fu1nes alone 1nay constitute a nuisance. See 39 .1lnr.
,Jur., 335, Par. 53:
"Every person has the right to have the a·ir
diffus-ed over his premises, \\'"hether located in the
city or country, in its natural ~tate and free fron1
artificial in1purities. However, hY air in its natural state and free from artifici'al i1npurities is
1neant pure air consistent \Yith tlie locality and
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character of the community.* * *and any business
although in itself lawful, which necessarily impregnates large volumes of the atmosphere with
disagreeable, unwholesome,. or offensive matter,
may become a nuisance to those occupying adjacent property, in case it is so near, and the atmosphere is contaminated to such an extent as substantially to impair the comfort or enjoyment of
adjacent occupants."
Page 340, Par. 58 :
"Noxious fumes, gases, or vapors may constitute an actionable nuisance, although produced in
carrying on a lawful business, where they result
in material injury to neighboring property or
interfere with its com£ ortable use and enjoyment."
And, Page 341, Par. 58 :
"As in other cases, the fact that a business
causing the nuisance is carried on in a careful
and prudent manner, and that nothing is done by
those managing it that is not a reasonable and
necessary incident of it, does not constitute a
defense."
The ·casting of light on another's premise·s .may constitute a nuisance. See 5 A.L.R. 2d 706:
"The private nuisance light cases, considered
as a whole, seem to warrant the generalization
that if the intensity of light shining from adjoining land is strong enough to seriously disturb a
person of ordinary sensibilities, or interfere "'~ith
an occupation which is no more than ordinarily
susceptible to light, it is a nuisance; if not, there
is no cause of action. The courts will not afford
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protection to hypersensitive individuals or industries. This is particularly well brought out in
Akers v. Marsh (1901) 19 App. D'C 28, infra, Par.
2, and Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows
(1948), Ore., 198 P. 2d 84 7, 5 A.L.R. 2d 690, infra.
Par. 3."
And see also the case of Green v. Spinning, Mo., 48
S W2d 51 at page 711 of the above A.L.R. annotation.
Further, it has been held that parking lots can easily
become nuisances beoause of night lighting and the illumi.nation fro~ headlights or motor vehicles patronizing
them. See page 713 of said annotation.
We have heen assuming, arguendo, that appellants
are located in an industrial area. We wish it to be reInerribered that we do not subscribe to this idea. The area
in which appellants live was once entirely agricultural
and was so when appellants acquired their home. Since
that time so1ne industry has grown up in and around the
neighborhood of appellants. This, however, does not give
respondents or any others the right, in the name of business or industry, to preempt the land of residents of long
standing in the community.
Due to the fart that the operations were more or less
li1nited and no night op·erations 'vere carried on and that
the parties were brothers, appellants 1nade no legal protest prior to 1951. It is contended, ho"rever, that the conduct of the business since that time has constituted a nuisanee, and it was at about that time that said nuisance
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began to make itself seriously felt. As in Beja.min v.
Lietz, (1949), 106 Utah 476, 211 P. 2d 4-d-9, it is the expansion of the business to which appellants object, and to
the resulting nighttime and Sabbath activity and the annoyances which result therefrom. It is contended that in
the expansion of the business respondents had regard
only for their own operation and the expediency thereof,
and they did not regard the rights of the appellants except as such rights may have been incidentally affected
by said expedience. The garage or "shop", as referred
to in the transcript of proceedings, \vas expanded so that
it vvas necessary in its use that lights must shine upon
and into the ho1ne of the appellants, and the trucks and
engines must n~essarily be driven in areas which are
closer to appellants' home than is in fact necessary.
The location of the shop also 1nakes any outdoor work
carried on more convenient if it is done in an area n1uch
closer to appellants' hon1e than might otherwise be necessary if the shop were located elsewhere, resulting in the
bulk of outdoor \vork being done in said area. 1\{uch could
be done to meet a satisfactory standard of quiet, even if
it should mean some expense to the respondents. As was
said in Quinn v. Americwn Spiral Spring arnd. M an.u,fa.cturing Co., supra, the defendants should have considered
these things before they established the various locations
of their improvements.

POINT III
IF THIS COURT SHOULD FIND AN ACTIONABLE
NUISANCE DOES EXIST BUT FINDS FURTHER THAT
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APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE FORM OF AN INJUNCTION IT IS RESPECT'
FULLY SUBMITTED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN REJECTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE AS TO DAMAGES
AND THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
LOWER COURT TO PERMIT A FINDING AS TO THE
AMO·UNT OF DAMAGES TO WHICH APPELLANTS ARE
ENTITLED.
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE
31 OF THE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED AN OBJECTION T~O A QUESTION PUT BY APPELLANTS'
OOUNSEL TO APPELLANT GLEN A. HATCH,
WHICH QUESTION WAS DESIGNATED TO ELICIT
TESTIMONY RELATIVE TO THE VALUE OF THE
APPELLANTS' PROPERTY.

At page 31 of the transcript, counsel for the plaintiff asked the plaintiff if he had formed an opinion as to
the value of the prop·erty he owned as it was now with the
nuisance continuing at all times. The court sustained an
objection to the question on the ground that there was
no foundation laid for an answer from the 'vitness. It
was then pointed out to the court that the witness "\vas an
ovvner of the prop·ert~T in question and had been for
several years. In addition to this jt had been shown that
he was on the loan co1nn1ittee of a bank in the area and
th~t he had had occasion to pass upon the values of property in the area with the view of lending money to the
owners and that he had done this \vork for 15 y·ears. In
addition, he had testified, and it ':vas undisputed, that he
had lived on the property since 1917 ( R-2). _.'\11 thesP
facto~s are sufficient to n1ake the plaintiff qualified to
testify as to the value.
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It is a rule of law, followed by most of the courts of
the United States, that an owner, especially one who has
lived on the property for a number of years, is competent to give testimony as to the value of the property.
As said in Kinter v. United States, 1946, 172 A.L.R. 232,
156 F. 2d 5:
''The owner ·may, because of his personal
knowledge of the property, the uses to which it
may be put, the condition of the improvements
erected thereon, testify as to its market value."
Many cases may he cited in support of this doctrine,
some of which will show that Utah subscribes to this doctrine. Among said cases are Salt Lake & R. R. Co. v.
Schramm, 1920, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90; Long Beach City
High School District v. Stewart, 1947, 30 Cal. 2d 763, 185
P. 2d 585, 173 A.L.R. 249; Spring Valley Waterworks v.
Drink house, 1891, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 681.
Under this well established doctrine, then, it is shown
that plaintiff Glen Hatch was entitled to testify as to the
value of the property in question, and to rule otherwise
constituted reversible error.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN, AT PAGE
70 OF TI-IE RECORD, IT SUSTAINED A l\.fOTION
TO STRIKE ALL OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE
APPELLANTS' EXPERT WITNESS LARSON.

Witness Charles A. Larson was called by the a.ppellants and through questioning testified that his business
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was that of selling and buying real estate and eon8tructing hornes. He had been in the real estatP business about
four years and had been constructing homes for 13 or 14
years on his own account. (R·-47) rJ~hese activjties had
been almost exclusively confined to the Bountiful area,
wherein the property in question is located. (R-~8) He
held at the time of trial a real estate broker's license,
a city real estate license and a state contractor's license.
~(R-48) He has sold businesses, farms and ho1nes in the
area. (R-48) He has sold property in the area of the
Glen Hatch home about half a mile to the south, and in
addition receives reports of other sales in the area
through the Real Estate Board. (R-56, 57) I-Ie is acquainted with the Glen Hatch home and the general area
surrounding it, including the industrial developn1ent
therein. (R-48) He had investigated the area and the said
Hatch hon1e prior to testifying at the trial. (~49)
After the above qualifications. of the witness Larson
were brought out, counsel began to question the witnes~
regarding certain n1eas-q.res of damage. The witness
stated. that he placed a rep~lacement value on app·ellants'
home, regardless of the location and surroundings, based
upon a replaeement cost of the hon1e less a consideration
of age and usage thereof. In other words, it was an estilnate of the rnarket value of appellants' home in a fair
location, which value was placed at $37,200.00. (R-49, 50)
Then the witness was asked to place a market valuation upon the appellant's home considering the railroad,
the· Phillips Petroleum refinery and husinesses the
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~1itchell

garage, the storage and loading racks of the
Phillips Petroleum Company and other businesses, but
excluding the W. S. Hatch Company business. The value
placed by him thereon taking into consideration just
those circmns tances was $25,000.00. ( R-50 to 53)
The witness was then asked what value he would
place upon the appellants' property for residential purposes if there was conducted next to appellants' property
a business and in the conducting of that business and in
the maintenance, repairing, cleaning, starting and servicing of trucks, their trucks, semi-trucks and trailers, the
operators thereof have caused and are causing, both
day and night, loud and unusual noises, by hamrnering
\Vi th sledge hammers and other objects upon truck tires
and other metal objects; in maintaining, repairing and
changing tires and for other purposes, a good portion
of this repair work taking place in the building that
serves as a garage at a distance of about 230 feet fro1n
the appellants' property and by the cleaning and greasing
of trucks, cause loud hissing of stean1 and loud and unusual noises, by the using of co1npressed air in grease
guns, and by the starting and testing and warn1ing up of
motors, and by driving trucks into the area and out, and
by racing motors, sometimes running then1 for long periods of tin1e, and by starting of n1otors, and having the
operation on practically a 24-hour basis where it is run
night and day, and with lights on the garage building and
in the area, lighting up the entire area and the back yard
of the appellants' home, and shining in the \vindo-\vs of
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the bedroo1n, and the operation of the trucks in thP rPar
of the business causes furnes to per1neate the appellants'
liorne, and assuming that this business operation will continue indefinitely and per1nanently, and that the noises
created can he heard throughout the appellants' home,
and that they disturb the sleep and the rest of the occupants. (R-53, 54) The witness placed a value under those
circumstances of $12,000 or $13,000, ( R-55) and further
stated that it is hard to say in a situation like that
vvhether you can find a buyer at any price. (R-56)
Upon cross-examination the witness was forced hy
the insistence of the cross-examiner, to give certain valuations vvhich he had not previously considered. But upon
his basic testimony as to the three different values he
remained steadfast because those had been based upon
observation. (R-60 et seq.) He had 1nade a valuation of
the property vvithout th.e industry about it, then had made
one with all the industry taken into consideration excluding the respondents~ premises, and then made a valuation
taking then1 all into consideration. Respondents contend
that because he put a particular Yalue upon the damage
contributed by defendant's property, he should be able
to do so with every other property in the area. Such is
not the case unless he is allowed the opportunity to exarnine the area again \Yi th those particular factors in
rnind, as he had done to prepare hin1self to testify before
trial -vvith respect to breaking down the effect of the defendants' operations upon plaintiffs' property separatelY frorn the others.
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In Ludlow v. Colorado Anintal By-Products Co.
( 1943), 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d 347, the court clearly
approves the n1easure of damages which was brought out
by the questioning of the witnes~ Larson. In that case
it was said, at page 235 of the Utah Reporter:
"It appears to be the view of appellant that
the rule of diminution of market value was not
properly applied. It is claimed that witnesses for
plaintiffs made valuations fron1 which they colnputed depreciation on so1ne theory of absence of
the plant structure and \Vithout reference to other
existing industries, activities and facilities. However, at least one witness indicated he took into
consideration the surrounding conditions, and he
based depreciation solely on the odors emanating
from defendant's plant. It appears that the trial
court based depreciation on the frequent recurrence of stench, not on any assun1ption that the
building and other physical structures of appellant as located constituted a nuisance. The findings and conclusions of the court indicate that in
assessing damages the trial judge used the proper
criterion-the difference in 111arket value of each
tract with its i1nproven1ents without the stench
nuisance existing, as cornpared \vith the value as
affected by such odors."
It appears patent upon the face of the record that
the witness had the requisite qualifications to testify as
to value.
2 Jones on Evidence (4th Ed.) 726, Opinions and

'Conclusions, Sec. 386 states:
"A witness is qualified to testify to the value
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of land if he has had an opportunity to forn1 a
correct opinion as to its value. Testirnony may be
given by real estate agents, assessors or other
public officers, or persons who are shown to have
been engaged in private business of such· a character as to give the1n speeial or peculiar knovvledge of the subject. Nor is it essential that the
witness should have bought or sold land in the
vicinity; his knowledge 1nay have been gained
by having dealt in sin1ilar property at another
place. Again it is not necessary th·a t he should
have known of actual sales of such tracts as the
one in question, or that his knowledge of sales
should have been personal, or that it should have
heen derived from the buyer or seller of the land
sold. The essentials are: 'First, a knowledge of
the intrinsic properties of the thing; secondly, a
knowledge of the state of the market.' and in deteTinining the qualifications of a witness, much
Inust be left to the discretion of the trial judge;
and this has also been held to be true as to the
forn1 and adequacy of the questions asked of the
witness."
When he attempted to testify as to value it was
objected that no proper foundation had been laid. The
court said he would hear the ans"\ver. (R-50, 51) Thenceforth, Mr. I_jarson's entire testin1ony was heard hy the
court.
The essence of Mr. Larson's testimony, as brought
out by the plaintiff, was to establish· the value of appellants' property as a residence under three different sets
of facts. First, the value of the prop·erty and home without any industrial surroundings. Second, the value of
the home and property considering all the industrial
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develop1nents in the area with the exception of respondents' property. Third, the value of the home and property considering all the industrial development in the area.
In the course of the questioning it was objected that the
witness had no knowledge of industrial values. Such
an objection was immaterial because the witness was
testifying as to the value of residential property only, on
which he \vas qualified to form an opinion.
At the close of this testimony, respondents made a
motion to strike the entire evidence of the witness Larson
on the grounds that "basically there is no foundation for
his testimony. That it's so confusing that nobody could
determine what he rnight mean by values." (R-70) Upon
inquiry by counsel for the plaintiffs as to what prompted
the court to grant the motion, the court replied:
"'1 don't think you have qualified hi1n for
one thing. I think there isn't a differentiation
between the W. S. Hatch Cornpany and the other
industries in that area on -vvhich a value of depreciation could be placed. I'n1 going to grant the
motion to strike. Yon can take your exception ... "

(R-70, 71)
It can be seen thereby that although the court had
permitted the witness to testify when his qualifications
\Vere known, he later changed his mind and threw out
the entire evidence. It is contended tl1at this is gross
abus of discretion in that the ground for such action was
an apparent belief, arrived at independently from any
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testimony in the case, that what the witness said was not
worthy of belief. Further, the remark quoted was contrary to the law cited in the Lud.low case, supra. It "\Vas
the judge's opinion that such a distinction could not he
made and, therefore, the testimony should be stricken.
But the witness was a qualified expert and the judge
was not. . While there is some discretion allowed the
judge as to what p·art of a witness' testimony he may believe, he cannot strike it from the record on the ground
tliat he does not believe it, because to do so would raise
his opinion over the rules of evidence and the opinion
of experts, whieh results the rules were made to prevent.
It is therefore respectfully contended that the trial
court erred in granting the motion to strike, that the
testi1nony should have remained a matter of record, that
the appellants are entitled to some relief, and that if thi ~
court declines to authorize injunctive relief, the case
should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial to
determine the amount of damages to which· appellants
are entitled.
I

CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the facts as found by the trial
court and we have shown that those facts were either
unwarranted or were misleading. We have done this by
referring to the record and analyzing the complete situation surrounding each particular finding of fact. \\T e
have· then recommended certain modifications to those
findings of fact which we respectfully submit should be
substituted therefor.
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lT nder thP~e changed findings of fact, \Ve sincerely
believe that a <·ase of nuisance has lwPn established; that
the activities of the respondents upon tLeir property
are unreasonable and unvvarranted in vievv of the condition of the neighborhood and in vie\v of their neighbors,
the appellants in this action. \V e believe that thi:-; nuisance is the type for which an injunction should issue,
if not to ·enjoin the entire business, at least to alter it
rnaterially to the benefit of the appellants.
We have shown that there exists an actionable nuisance and should the court believe that no injunctive relief should be had in this particular case, we contend
that there should he relief in the for111 of darnages and
that the case should be re1nanded for a hearing of that
Issue.
Respectfully submitted,
()SCAR W.

~'I OYI.JE, ~JR.

DANIEI-1 T. MOYI.JE
.HARDIN A. WHITNEY, ,JR..
of the firrn of ::vr oYLE & :\f oYLE
.c!ttorneys for Appellants
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